

Message Text

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ORIGIN INR-07

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 SS-15 PM-03 ACDA-05 SSO-00

NSCE-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 INRE-00 AECE-00 AEC-05 NSC-05

L-02 PRS-01 SP-02 /058 R

DRAFTED BY INR/STA:JMMARCUM:JMP
APPROVED BY EUR/RPM:EJSTREATOR
C:HSOHNENFELDT
PM/DCA:EIFFT
ACDA/NWT:JRSHEA
S/S:WHLUERS

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P 152248Z JAN 75
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO USMISSION NATO PRIORITY
INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY

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E.O. 11652:X-GDS-3
TAGS: PARM, US, UR
SUBJECT:TTBT-PNE NEGOTIATIONS AND ENMOD DISCUSSIONS:
LETTER TO NAC

1. REQUEST MISSION PREPARE FOLLOWING LETTER FOR SYG LUNS,
WITH COPIES TO NAC PERMREPS, VIA USUAL SECRET CHANNELS.
PLEASE ADVISE DEPARTMENT OF DATE LETTER CIRCULATED.

2. BEGIN TEXT: THE PURPOSE OF THIS LETTER IS TO SUMMARIZE
FOR YOU AND OTHER COUNCIL MEMBERS THE NEGOTIATIONS ON AN
AGREEMENT GOVERNING NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS FOR PEACEFUL PUR-
POSES (PNES) IN ACCORDANCE WITH ARTICLE III OF THE THRES-
HOLD TEST BAN TREATY, AND THE DISCUSSIONS PURSUANT TO THE
US-SOVIET JOINT STATEMENT OF JULY 3, 1974, ON THE SUBJECT
OF ENVIRONMENTAL WARFARE, BOTH OF WHICH WERE RECENTLY
BEGUN IN MOSCOW.

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3. ARTICLE III OF THE THRESHOLD TEST BAN TREATY PROVIDED
THAT "UNDERGROUND NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES
SHALL BE GOVERNED BY AN AGREEMENT WHICH IS TO BE NEGOTIATED
AND CONCLUDED BY THE PARTIES AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE

TIME". THE FIRST ROUND OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS TOOK PLACE IN MOSCOW FROM OCTOBER 7 UNTIL NOVEMBER 6, 1974.

4. THE PRINCIPAL TASKS OF THE US DELEGATION WERE TO ELICIT SOVIET VIEWS AND PROPOSALS ON THE CONTENT OF THE PNE AGREEMENT AND TO OBTAIN A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THE NATURE OF THE SOVIET PNE PROGRAM. DURING THE NEGOTIATIONS THE US DELEGATION STRESSED THAT ANY PNE AGREEMENT MUST SATISFY THE FOLLOWING CRITERIA:

(I) PNES MUST NOT PROVIDE WEAPON-RELATED BENEFITS OTHERWISE PRECLUDED OR LIMITED BY THE TTBT.

(II) THE FACT PNE ACTIVITIES ARE NOT CONTRIBUTING TO SUCH BENEFITS MUST BE ADEQUATELY VERIFIABLE.

(III) THE AGREEMENT MUST BE CONSISTENT WITH EXISTING TREATY OBLIGATIONS, INCLUDING IN PARTICULAR THE LIMITED TEST BAN TREATY (LTBT).

5. IN ADDITION TO ELABORATING ON THESE BASIC CRITERIA, THE US DELEGATION PRESENTED DETAILS OF ITS PNE PROGRAM, NOTING IN PARTICULAR THAT IT IS VERY LIMITED IN SCOPE; THE SOVIET PROGRAM APPEARS TO BE MUCH BROADER. THE US DELEGATION STATED THAT PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE INVOLVE ONLY THE POSSIBILITY OF A FEW EXPERIMENTS USING CONTAINED PNES. WITH RESPECT TO VERIFICATION, THE US DELEGATION TOOK THE POSITION THAT, FOR ALL PNES, INFORMATION ON THE YIELD, PURPOSE, DEPTH OF BURIAL, GEOGRAPHICAL COORDINATES AND GEOLOGY OF THE EXPLOSION SITE, INCLUDING BASIC PHYSICAL PROPERTIES OF THE ROCK, SHOULD BE PROVIDED WITH OBSERVERS CONFIRMING AS MUCH OF THIS INFORMATION AS POSSIBLE.

6. IN THE MOSCOW NEGOTIATIONS, THE FOLLOWING PRINCIPAL FEATURES OF THE SOVIET POSITION EMERGED:

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(I) THEY ASSERTED THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO LIMITS ON THE YIELDS OR NUMBERS OF PNES, CLAIMING THAT THIS WAS CONSISTENT WITH THE OBLIGATIONS OF NPT ARTICLE V. THEY PROPOSED THAT THE TIME, LOCATION, YIELD AND PURPOSE OF PNES GREATER THAN 150 KT BE PROVIDED PRIOR TO THE EVENT, WITH ACTUAL YIELD AND RESULTS PROVIDED AFTERWARD. FOR PNES WITH YIELDS GREATER THAN ABOUT 50-70 KT, BUT BELOW 150 KT, SIMILAR PRE-SHOT DATA WOULD BE PROVIDED, BUT ADDED DATA WOULD BE PROVIDED ONLY FOR CASES WHERE THEY CONSIDERED THAT THE YIELD MIGHT BE ASSESSED AS ABOVE THE THRESHOLD. FOR PNES BELOW 50-70 KT, VERIFICATION WOULD RELY ON NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS.

(II) THEY PROPOSED A "BROAD" AGREEMENT OF COOPERATION WITH THE US IN PNES, IN WHICH THE TTBT ARTICLE III VERIFICATION PROVISIONS WOULD BE EMBEDDED. THEY STATED THAT THE AGREEMENT MIGHT INCLUDE A JOINT COMMISSION ON COOPERATION IN PNES, EXCHANGES OF INFORMATION, INSTRUMENTS

AND TECHNICAL PERSONNEL, JOINT SCIENTIFIC R&D WORK IN THE INSTITUTES OF BOTH COUNTRIES AND JOINT PNE PROJECTS IN THIRD COUNTRIES IN ACCORDANCE WITH ARTICLE V OF THE NPT. THEY ARE ALSO ATTEMPTING TO TIE THE DEGREE OF COOPERATION INVOLVED IN THE "NARROW" TASK OF VERIFICATION UNDER ARTICLE III OF THE TTBT TO HOW "BROAD" AN AGREEMENT THE US WILL ACCEPT. SOVIET DELEGATION CHAIRMAN MOROKHOV REMARKED THAT IF THE PNE AGREEMENT IS NARROWLY CONFINED TO ARTICLE III CONSIDERATIONS THEN ONLY "MINIMUM" VERIFICATION INFORMATION WOULD BE PROVIDED.

(III) THE SOVIETS AGREED IN PRINCIPLE AT THE JULY SUMMIT THAT US OBSERVERS COULD BE PRESENT FOR AT LEAST SOME PNES, BUT, AS REPORTED TO THE NAC BY SECRETARY KISSINGER ON DECEMBER 12, IN THE FIRST ROUND OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS THEIR DELEGATION BACKED AWAY FROM THIS UNDERSTANDING. MOROKHOV STATED THAT HE COULD NOT TELL US WHETHER OR NOT THE SOVIETS NOW FAVOR ARRANGEMENTS FOR OBSERVERS. THE SOVIET DELEGATION INDICATED THAT THE VERIFICATION INFORMATION TO BE OBTAINED BY OBSERVERS WOULD BE ROUTINELY AVAILABLE TO PARTICIPANTS OR "REPRESENTATIVES" IN JOINT PNE PROJECTS. THEY DID NOT, HOWEVER,
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RULE OUT AN ARTICLE III AGREEMENT DEALING WITH VERIFICATION MATTERS ONLY.

(IV) THE SOVIETS ALSO DISCUSSED THEIR CURRENT PNE PROGRAM AND LISTED SEVERAL APPLICATIONS THAT MIGHT BE UNDERTAKEN IN THE FUTURE.

7. THE US DELEGATION NOTED THAT THE SOVIET LISTING OF PNE APPLICATIONS DID NOT INCLUDE ANY CONTAINED PNES ABOVE 100 KT AND OFFERED, ON AN AD REFERENDUM BASIS, TO ACCEPT A 100 KT LIMIT ON CONTAINED PNES PROVIDED ADEQUATE VERIFICATION, INCLUDING OBSERVERS, WERE ASSURED. THE SOVIET DELEGATION DID NOT ACCEPT THIS PROPOSAL, HOWEVER, STATING AMONG OTHER REASONS THAT SOME CONTAINED APPLICATIONS MIGHT EVENTUALLY REQUIRE MUCH LARGER YIELDS.

8. THE TTBT/PNE NEGOTIATIONS ARE NOW IN A WORKING RECESS, AND ARE EXPECTED TO RESUME ABOUT FEBRUARY 10.

9. AT THE JULY 1974 US - USSR SUMMIT MEETING, THE US AGREED WITH THE SOVIETS TO ADVOCATE EFFECTIVE MEASURES TO OVERCOME THE DANGERS OF THE USE OF ENVIRONMENTAL MODIFI-

CATION TECHNIQUES FOR MILITARY PURPOSES. THE TWO SIDES AGREED TO MEET BILATERALLY TO EXPLORE THE PROBLEM.

PURSUANT TO THE SUMMIT STATEMENT, US AND SOVIET REPRESENTATIVES MET IN MOSCOW FROM NOVEMBER 1 THROUGH NOVEMBER 5. THE OBJECTIVES OF THE US DELEGATION WERE:

..... (I) TO EXPLORE AND ASSESS THE NATURE AND SCOPE OF
.....SOVIET INTEREST IN MEASURES TO OVERCOME THE
.....DANGERS OF THE USE OF ENVIRONMENTAL MODIFICATION
.....TECHNIQUES FOR MILITARY PURPOSES;

.....(II)TO ASSESS THE PROSPECT OF EVENTUALLY ARRIVING AT
.....A COMMON APPROACH, AND TO MAKE CLEAR TO THE
.....SOVIET SIDE THAT SUCH AN APPROACH CANNOT BE
.....EXPECTED ON THE BASIS OF THE DRAFT CONVENTION
.....THE SOVIET UNION INTRODUCED IN THE UN GENERAL
.....ASSEMBLY.

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10. DURING THE MEETING THE SOVIETS REPEATEDLY PRESSED THE US SIDE TO ACCEPT THEIR DRAFT OR TO TABLE A DRAFT OF ITS OWN. THEY EMPHASIZED THAT PROHIBITED ACTIVITIES SHOULD BE SPECIFIED IN DETAIL AND INCLUDE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT. THE US SIDE MADE CLEAR THE UNACCEPTIBILITY OF THE SOVIET DRAFT AS A BASIS FOR THE DISCUSSIONS. THE DELEGATION STRESSED THE NEED, AS THE FIRST STEP, TO AGREE ON A SATISFACTORY CONCEPTUAL APPROACH TO DEFINING THE SUBJECT MATTER OF ANY MEASURES; AND FOR DIFFERENTIATING MEASURES CONCERNED WITH THIS MATTER FROM OTHER ARMS CONTROL PROBLEMS, THE ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS OF WEAPONS, AND OTHER "ENVIRONMENTAL" PROBLEMS. IT WAS MADE CLEAR THAT IN THE US VIEW CONSIDERATION OF A CONVENTION, INCLUDING THE DEGREE OF DETAIL REQUIRED, AT THIS EXPLORATORY STAGE WAS PREMATURE.

11. WITH REGARD TO CONCEPTUAL APPROACH, THE US SIDE PROPOSED THAT THE SUBJECT MATTER UNDER DISCUSSION BE DEFINED AS "EFFORTS TO RELEASE OR MANIPULATE, THROUGH THE USE OF ENVIRONMENTAL MODIFICATION TECHNIQUES, NATURAL PROCESSES OR FORCES FOR PURPOSES OF DESTRUCTION OR DISRUPTION DIRECTED AGAINST AN ADVERSARY." IN PARTICULAR, THE US DELEGATION SUGGESTED THAT THE USE FOR MILITARY PURPOSES OF SUCH TECHNIQUES WHICH COULD HAVE WIDESPREAD, LONG LASTING OR SEVERE EFFECTS SHOULD FALL WITHIN THE PURVIEW OF ANY PROPOSED BAN.

12. THE US DELEGATION ALSO SOUGHT CLARIFICATION OF THE INTENDED SCOPE OF THE SOVIET DRAFT CONVENTION, WHICH REFERS TO "MILITARY AND OTHER PURPOSES INCOMPATIBLE WITH

THE MAINTENANCE OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, HUMAN WELL-BEING AND HEALTH." THE SOVIET SIDE INDICATED THAT THIS LANGUAGE WAS DESIGNED TO COVER ALL POSSIBLE HOSTILE USES OF ENVIRONMENTAL MODIFICATION TECHNIQUES, WHETHER OR NOT THEY WERE CONDUCTED IN A DECLARED WAR. THEY MADE CLEAR THAT INCIDENTAL EFFECTS OF CIVILIAN APPLICATIONS WOULD NOT BE INCLUDED.

13. IN RESPONSE TO THE SOVIET PROPOSAL FOR A BAN ON RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL MODIFICATION
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TECHNIQUES, THE US SIDE STATED THAT A BROAD PROHIBITION OF R&D WAS NOT PRACTICAL. THE DELEGATION POINTED OUT THE INTRINSICALLY DUAL (CIVIL OR MILITARY) APPLICABILITY OF MUCH RESEARCH ON ENVIRONMENTAL MODIFICATION AND THE LIKELY IMPRACTICABILITY OF VERIFYING A BROAD PROHIBITION ON RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT FOR MILITARY PURPOSES.

14. IN THE COURSE OF THE MEETING, THE SIDES ALSO EXAMINED THE STATE OF SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL RESEARCH IN VARIOUS AREAS OF ENVIRONMENTAL MODIFICATION.

15. FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF BOTH SIDES THE EXCHANGE OF OPINIONS IN MOSCOW WAS USEFUL FOR CLARIFICATION AND REACHING AGREEMENT ON POSITIONS IN THE FUTURE. IT WAS AGREED TO HOLD FURTHER CONSULTATIONS IN WASHINGTON AT A LATER DATE. THESE CONSULTATIONS WILL TAKE PLACE AROUND THE END OF FEBRUARY. KISSINGER

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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 26 AUG 1999
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: DIPLOMATIC COMMUNICATIONS, JOINT VENTURES, LIMITED TEST BAN TREATY, PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS, TEXT
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 15 JAN 1975
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: SmithRJ
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1975STATE010042
Document Source: ADS
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: INR/STA:JMMARCUM:JMP
Enclosure: DG ALTERED
Executive Order: 11652 X-GDS-3
Errors: n/a
Film Number: D750016-0220
From: STATE
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1975/newtext/t19750189/baaaagmz.tel
Line Count: 250
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, TEXT ON MICROFILM
Office: ORIGIN INR
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 5
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: SmithRJ
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 23 APR 2003
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <23 APR 2003 by ElyME>; APPROVED <23 OCT 2003 by SmithRJ>
Review Markings:

Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
05 JUL 2006

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: <DBA CORRECTED> gwr 971001
Subject: n/a
TAGS: PARM, UR, US
To: NATO INFO MOSCOW
Type: TE
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 05 JUL 2006